Maine Law Review
Volume 65
Number 2 Colloquium: Local Food || Global
Food:
Do We Have What It Takes to Reinvent the U.S.
Food System?

Article 25

January 2013

The Law Court's Proper Application of Miranda in State v. Bragg: A
"Matter-of-Fact Communication" to the Defendant Regarding
Evidence Against Him Will Not Typically Constitute "Interrogation"
Stephen B. Segal
University of Maine School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/mlr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Criminal Law Commons, and the Evidence Commons

Recommended Citation
Stephen B. Segal, The Law Court's Proper Application of Miranda in State v. Bragg: A "Matter-of-Fact
Communication" to the Defendant Regarding Evidence Against Him Will Not Typically Constitute
"Interrogation", 65 Me. L. Rev. 823 (2013).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/mlr/vol65/iss2/25

This Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Maine School of Law
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Maine Law Review by an authorized editor of University of
Maine School of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact mdecrow@maine.edu.

THE LAW COURT’S PROPER APPLICATION OF
MIRANDA IN STATE V. BRAGG: A “MATTER-OFFACT COMMUNICATION” TO THE DEFENDANT
REGARDING EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM WILL NOT
TYPICALLY CONSTITUTE “INTERROGATION”
Stephen B. Segal
I.
II.

III.

IV.
V.

INTRODUCTION
LEGAL BACKGROUND
A.
The Fifth Amendment and Miranda
B.
The Functional Equivalent of a Question
C. The Functional Equivalent of a Question and Its Exceptions in Maine
THE BRAGG DECISION
A.
Factual Background
B.
Procedural History
C. Arguments
D. Decision of the Law Court
ANALYSIS
CONCLUSION

824

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:2

THE LAW COURT’S PROPER APPLICATION OF
MIRANDA IN STATE V. BRAGG: A “MATTER-OFFACT COMMUNICATION” TO THE DEFENDANT
REGARDING EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM WILL NOT
TYPICALLY CONSTITUTE “INTERROGATION”
Stephen B. Segal*
I. INTRODUCTION
In State v. Bragg,1 Tammy Bragg was convicted of a Class D crime for
operating under the influence (OUI)2 at the completion of a jury trial,3 and was
ordered to pay a fine of $800 and her license was suspended for ninety days.4
During her trial, Bragg submitted a motion to suppress statements she made in the
police officer’s vehicle and at the police station on the grounds that she was not
read her Miranda warnings5 prior to making the statements.6 The Superior Court
denied her motion, however, concluding that Miranda warnings were not necessary
in the officer’s vehicle because her statements were not made while “in custody.”7
In addition, the warnings were unnecessary at the police station when the officer
informed Bragg that the intoxilyzer test confirmed that “her blood alcohol content
(BAC) was .13% . . . and that the presumptive level of intoxication in Maine is
.08%”8 because her subsequent incriminating statements were not in response to
“the functional equivalent of a question.”9
On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, was
asked to rule for the first time in Maine10 whether a police officer’s statements to
the defendant regarding evidence against her “was the functional equivalent of
direct questioning and reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response,”
requiring a Miranda warning.11 The Law Court affirmed the denial of the motion
to suppress statements made by Bragg in the cruiser, and those made at the police
station on the grounds that the officer’s statement informing Bragg of the
* J.D. Candidate, 2014, University of Maine School of Law. The author would like to thank
Professor Melvyn Zarr for his invaluable wisdom and insight on this Note, as well as family and friends
for their ongoing support and encouragement.
1. 2012 ME 102, 48 A.3d 769.
2. 29-A M.R.S.A. § 2411(1-A)(A) (2011).
3. State v. Bragg, 2012 ME 102, ¶ 1, 48 A.3d 769.
4. Id. ¶ 7.
5. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution may not enter statements by the defendant into
evidence when made in response to questions from law enforcement while deprived of his freedom
unless the defendant is warned before questioning “that he has a right to remain silent, that any
statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of
an attorney, either retained or appointed.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
6. Bragg, 2012 ME 102, ¶ 7, 48 A.3d 769.
7. Id.
8. Id. ¶ 6.
9. Id. ¶ 7.
10. Id. ¶ 16.
11. Id. ¶ 14.
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intoxilyzer results was merely “a matter-of-fact communication of the evidence,”
which was not “reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.”12 In coming
to its conclusion, the Law Court held that Bragg was entitled to information
regarding her BAC level upon request,13 and even though she did not request it,
“the officer’s simple statement relating that information” would not trigger a
Miranda warning.14
This Note considers whether the unanimous majority in Bragg properly
concluded that criminal defendants who are only informed of evidence against
them are not entitled to a Miranda warning. This Note begins in Part II with a brief
history and overview of the purposes of the United States Supreme Court’s ruling
in Miranda v. Arizona,15 and how Maine has determined when the warnings should
be applied, particularly in the context of statements made by law enforcement
officers that rise to the level of a “functional equivalent of a question.” In Part III,
this Note determines how Bragg will likely pose obstacles for defendants in
attempting to bring suppression motions regarding statements made in response to
evidence presented against them by law enforcement. In Part IV, this Note
proposes that Bragg is consistent with other jurisdictions and the purposes of
Miranda, and quite clearly demonstrates that criminal defendants in Maine will be
limited in arguing that they were entitled to a Miranda warning after being told of
truthful evidence against them. Finally, in Part V, this Note concludes by arguing
that courts should rely on Bragg in similar cases, as long as it is done on a case-bycase basis.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Fifth Amendment and Miranda
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that “[n]o
person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself.”16 Before and after implementation of the Fifth Amendment, various
statutes have sought to exclude “confessions by torture” in conjunction with the
common law rule against admission of involuntary confessions.17 Nevertheless,
prior to the landmark ruling in Miranda, statements made by suspects, especially
confessions, had “often been extorted to save law enforcement officials the trouble
and effort of obtaining valid and independent evidence” to ensure a conviction.18
12. Id. ¶ 16.
13. The statute provides that “[o]n request, full information concerning a test must be made
available to the person tested or that person's attorney by the law enforcement officer.” 29-A M.R.S.A.
§ 2521(9) (2011).
14. Bragg, 2012 ME 102, ¶ 16, 48 A.3d 769. The court also affirmed the denial of the motion
regarding statements made in the officer’s vehicle on the grounds that Bragg was “subject only to an
investigatory detention . . . [and] as a general rule, ‘persons temporarily detained pursuant to such stops
are not “in custody” for the purposes of Miranda.’” Id. ¶ 9 (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S.
420, 440 (1984)).
15. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
17. Michael Theodore Bigos, Revisiting the Voluntariness of Confessions after State v. Sawyer, 54
ME. L. REV. 411, 413 (2002).
18. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 519 (1963).
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As a result, the Supreme Court altered the involuntary confession rule over a period
of thirty years leading up to Miranda by developing procedures intended “to
generally conform police officers’ conduct to a lawful, civilized, and noninquisitorial standard.”19
Prior to the Miranda ruling, in Escobedo v. Illinois,20 the Court acknowledged
that such abuse was particularly prevalent “between arrest and indictment” because
this was the timeframe when most criminal suspects submitted statements to the
police.21 In the context of Escobedo, defense counsel asked to speak with his
client, who was being held for interrogation at the police station, over a period of
three hours.22 The officers denied each of the attorney’s requests.23 Likewise, the
defendant asked to speak with his attorney on a number of occasions, to which
officers told him that his attorney “didn’t want to see him.”24 In ruling that one’s
right to counsel exists before indictment, the Court explained that “[o]ur
Constitution, unlike some others, strikes the balance in favor of the right of the
accused to be advised by his lawyer of his privilege against self-incrimination.”25
Two years after Escobedo, the Court reaffirmed its belief of the importance in
reminding criminal defendants of their rights to be free from self-incrimination by
adopting procedural safeguards to further protect their constitutional rights.26 Thus,
in Miranda, the Court stated that the prosecution cannot admit into evidence
statements made by a person or suspect obtained while under “custodial
interrogation,”27 unless the person is told prior to questioning that “he has a right to
remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against
him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or
appointed.”28 The person or suspect has the right to voluntarily waive such rights,
but if at any time he changes his mind and decides to exercise these rights,
questioning must cease.29 In addition, although he may have made statements
voluntarily or answered some inquiries by law enforcement, he may refrain from
speaking further until he has spoken with a lawyer or consented to additional
questioning.30
The Miranda decision was motivated in part by the Court’s finding that law
enforcement agents were given instruction manuals regarding how to successfully
break down suspects during in-custody interrogation, with particular emphasis on

19. Bigos, supra note 17, at 413-14.
20. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
21. Id. at 488.
22. Id. at 480-81.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 481.
25. Id. at 488.
26. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
27. Id. The Court explained that “custodial interrogation” refers to “questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant way.” Id.
28. Id. An officer need not recite this precise language when reciting the Miranda warning so long
as the defendant is informed of his rights to an attorney and freedom from self-incrimination. California
v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 359-60 (1981).
29. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45.
30. Id. at 445.
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intimidation and psychological ploys.31 One such manual explained the purpose of
intimidating and breaking down the suspect:
If at all practicable, the interrogation should take place in the investigator's office
or at least in a room of his own choice. The subject should be deprived of every
psychological advantage. In his own home he may be confident, indignant, or
recalcitrant. He is more keenly aware of his rights and more reluctant to tell of his
indiscretions or criminal behavior within the walls of his home. Moreover his
family and other friends are nearby, their presence lending moral support. In his
office, the investigator possesses all the advantages. The atmosphere suggests the
invincibility of the forces of the law.32

When law enforcement agents were unable to obtain the responses they desired
through the methods suggested in the manual, “[t]he police then persuade[d],
trick[ed], or cajole[d] [the defendant] out of exercising his constitutional rights.”33
As a result, defendants were stripped of their right to remain silent as afforded them
under the Fifth Amendment, and their statements were not truly voluntary.34 The
purpose of Miranda was to combat unethical practices by law enforcement and to
lay out procedural safeguards for those people who are under “custodial
interrogation,” but courts across the country still needed guidance as to how to
determine whether a given defendant was both in custody and subject to
interrogation so as to invoke a Miranda warning.
B. The Functional Equivalent of a Question
In Rhode Island v. Innis,35 the Court clarified that “interrogation” within the
meaning of Miranda does not only encompass direct questions, but also
communications that “reflect a measure of compulsion above and beyond that
inherent in custody itself.”36 More specifically, interrogation includes the
“functional equivalent” of a question, including statements or actions taken by law
enforcement (besides those that would typically be associated with one being
arrested and taken under police custody) that they “should know are reasonably
likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.”37 The specific facts of
Innis involved a robbery suspect being driven to the police station by three
officers.38 On the way to the police station, two of the officers began discussing
between themselves their concern regarding a missing gun that was used in the
robbery, and were fearful that a child may find it and cause harm to himself or
others.39 The suspect overheard this conversation, and interrupted to say that he
knew where the gun was and would take them to it; he did in fact lead them to the

31. See id. at 448-54 for a detailed account of what a typical manual instructed its interrogation
officers to do with the suspect.
32. Id. at 449-50 (citations omitted).
33. Id. at 455.
34. Id. at 460.
35. 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
36. Id. at 300.
37. Id. at 301.
38. Id. at 294.
39. Id. at 294-95.
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gun.40 The Court ruled that the defendant was not entitled to a Miranda warning
because he had not been subjected to the functional equivalent of a question.41 The
officers were chatting amongst themselves and the defendant was not a party to the
conversation; therefore, the officers could not have known that their comments
would be reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.42
Innis thereby established that, in order to determine whether a statement or
action amounts to the functional equivalent of a question, courts are directed to
examine the suspect’s perception of the interaction with police, as opposed to an
officer’s intent to conduct interrogation.43 Nevertheless, because police officers
cannot be held responsible for “unforeseeable results of their words or actions, the
definition of interrogation can extend only to words or actions on the part of police
officers that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response.”44
Following Innis, the Court further held that the privileges and protections of
Miranda extend to all persons regardless of the nature of the crime,45 and continued
to classify statements and actions that would meet the definition of a functional
equivalent of a question.46 Over the last three decades, courts have generally
agreed, regardless of jurisdiction, on how to apply Miranda in conjunction with
Innis, especially with regard to identifying when a person is under interrogation by
way of a functional equivalent of a question.
For example, in United States v. Padilla,47 the defendant’s statements were
suppressed because they were made after being subjected to the functional
equivalent of a question.48 In that case, the defendant, Padilla, was not read his
Miranda rights after being placed under arrest by an FBI agent, and refused to
assist in the investigation.49 After Padilla was told that this was his “last chance” to
cooperate, he made an incriminating statement.50 Although the district court
denied Padilla’s suppression motion on the grounds that he had not been subjected
to interrogation, the Ninth Circuit reversed, ruling that he had been subjected to the
functional equivalent of a question within the meaning of Innis, and the agent
should have known that the “last chance” statement would be reasonably likely to
40. Id. at 295.
41. Id. at 303.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 301.
44. Id. at 301-02 (emphasis in original). Although courts are instructed to use an objective standard
in order to determine whether the police officer should have known that his statements or actions would
be reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect or defendant, the Court added
that “[a]ny knowledge the police may have had concerning the unusual susceptibility of a defendant to a
particular form of persuasion might be an important factor” in the analysis. Id. at 302 n.8.
45. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 434 (1984) (holding that one who is subjected to
custodial interrogation is entitled to a Miranda warning regardless of the seriousness of the offense that
he is arrested or suspected for).
46. See Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520, 529 (1987) (holding that one who is in custody and
subjected to “compelling influences, [or] psychological ploys” is reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response).
47. 387 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2004).
48. Id. at 1093.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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elicit an incriminating response.51
Padilla is a classic example of the functional equivalent doctrine. Padilla
submitted an incriminating response while under intense psychological pressure
from law enforcement and, as a result, was stripped of his Fifth Amendment right
to be free from self-incrimination. The Innis framework was designed specifically
to combat such police tactics and, in doing so, created a proper balance between the
right of law enforcement to conduct investigations and the right of the suspect to
maintain his constitutional rights.
A line of cases in the 1990s and 2000s ruled that when a police officer does
nothing more than inform the person of the evidence against him, this will not give
rise to the functional equivalent of a question. For example, in United States v.
Payne,52 the Fourth Circuit upheld the defendant’s conviction because his
incriminating statements to law enforcement were made after he was informed only
of inculpatory evidence against him.53 In that case, the defendant, Payne, was
arrested for selling cocaine to an undercover FBI agent on two separate
occasions.54 Following his arrest, Payne was read his Miranda rights.55 He then
spoke with his attorney by telephone, and thereafter informed the agents that he
would not speak with them further until he spoke with his attorney in person.56
While being transported to the U.S. Marshals Service, however, an FBI agent told
Payne that “[the FBI] found a gun at your house.”57 Payne then replied, “I just had
it for my protection.”58
Prior to trial, Payne filed a motion to suppress his statement on the grounds
that he was subjected to interrogation in violation of Miranda.59 The district court
denied his motion because the agent’s statement “was not the functional equivalent
of interrogation . . . .”60 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit upheld the ruling, noting that
the definition of interrogation under Innis is not so general as to include “all
declaratory statements by police officers concerning the nature of the charges
against the suspect and the evidence relating to those charges.”61 In addition, the
agent’s statement did not require an incriminating response or any response at all.62
Similarly, in Enoch v. Gramley,63 the Seventh Circuit upheld the defendant’s
conviction, because, inter alia, the defendant’s incriminating response came after
police merely informed him of the victim’s identity and evidence against him for

51. Id. “It is difficult to imagine any purpose for such a statement [of informing the defendant this
was his last chance to cooperate] other than to elicit a response.” Id.
52. 954 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1992).
53. Id. at 200.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 201.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 202. The court also noted that comments regarding evidence against the suspect in his
presence cannot be barred by the Fifth Amendment as a general rule; in fact, “it may even be in the
interest of a defendant to be kept informed about matters relating to the charges against him.” Id.
62. Id. at 203.
63. 70 F.3d 1490 (7th Cir. 1995).
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which they had reason to keep him in custody.64 Upon his arrest, the defendant,
Enoch, was read his Miranda rights; Enoch then stated that he wanted to speak
with an attorney, to which the officer explained that he would first be processed at
the local jail for murder.65 Enoch proceeded to ask who the victim was and—upon
learning her identity to be Kay Burns and that the police had a witness who claimed
to have seen Enoch leave her house the night of the murder—then stated, “[o]h no,
not Kay Burns.”66 Enoch then made additional incriminating statements without
being prompted to speak by the officer; in fact, the officer told him that he would
not pose any more questions.67
After Enoch sought to suppress his statements, the state trial court denied the
motion because the statements were not made during interrogation, and on direct
appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed.68 However, on a subsequent habeas
petition, the district court ruled that Enoch’s Miranda rights were violated when he
was informed about the witness who saw him leave the victim’s house on the night
of the murder.69 Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that Enoch
had not been subjected to interrogation after he asserted his right to speak with an
attorney because no “reasonable objective observer would believe that the
encounter was ‘reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the
suspect.’”70
In addition to situations where a defendant is presented with truthful evidence
against him, Miranda warnings are not typically required when a defendant
specifically requests certain information and police then provide that requested
information. For example, in United States v. Thomas,71 the Seventh Circuit
upheld the district court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress because the
officer did nothing more than provide the defendant with information she had
requested regarding the pending investigation against her.72 In that case, the
defendant, Riggs, invoked her right to have counsel present before any more
questions could be asked of her, and she argued on appeal that the special agent’s
subsequent “comment to her regarding her alibi constitute[d] improper
interrogation”73 because the agent “knew that he was reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response from Riggs when he told her about the evidence that
64. Id. at 1500.
65. Id. at 1499.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1500 (citations omitted). For an example of a situation in which the Seventh Circuit ruled
that a reasonable objective observer would conclude that a person was subjected to interrogation, see
Killebrew v. Endicott, 992 F.2d 660, 663 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that the suspect was subjected to the
functional equivalent of interrogation when he had not been read his Miranda rights and the officer
promised to let the district attorney know of any cooperation they received from the suspect).
71. 11 F.3d 1392 (7th Cir. 1993).
72. Id. at 1397.
73. Under the so-called Edwards standard, after an accused has invoked his right to counsel during
in-custody interrogation, he cannot be said to have waived his rights by showing that he subsequently
responded to additional questioning by law enforcement “unless the accused himself initiates further
communication, exchanges, or conversations with police.” Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85
(1981).
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contradicted her alibi.”74
The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that, while there may be some question as
to whether the functional equivalent of a question is triggered when law
enforcement provide “unsolicited” information to a suspect regarding evidence
against him, this was a different situation because Riggs had requested to be
informed of what was found during the course of the investigation.75 As a result, it
could not be said that the agent’s relay of such information, without anything
further, meant that he reinitiated interrogation after Riggs expressly requested
counsel to be present: it was Riggs, after all, who had “initiated the
communications.”76
As these cases demonstrate, the functional equivalent of a question will not
typically be triggered when law enforcement do nothing more than truthfully
present a defendant with evidence that exists against him, especially when the
defendant specifically requested to be informed of such information. This standard
has been followed consistently across the country. Nevertheless, as Innis cautions,
each case should be evaluated on its own merits to determine whether or not a
defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights have been violated.
C. The Functional Equivalent of a Question and Its Exceptions in Maine
Prior to Bragg, Maine courts had not addressed whether mere presentation of
evidence to a defendant would constitute the functional equivalent of a question.
The Law Court, however, has had several occasions to determine whether a
defendant had been subjected to the functional equivalent of a question within the
meaning of Innis in other contexts. In doing so, it has generally followed the
framework of analysis as developed in Innis.
For example, in State v. Nixon,77 the Law Court held that the defendant’s
incriminating statement should have been suppressed because it was in response to
the functional equivalent of a question.78 The defendant, Nixon, was taken into
custody after the Portland Police Department had received a tip that Nixon had
murdered the victim.79 After invoking his right to an attorney, Nixon noticed a
diagram of the crime scene on the table showing the position of the victim’s
body.80 The detective saw Nixon “peering” at the diagram, and proceeded to put it
in front of Nixon, noting that he “might find this interesting.”81 Nixon
subsequently pointed to the crime scene depiction, and stated, “I'll tell you one
thing, he wasn't there, he was over there.”82 The Superior Court denied Nixon’s
74. United States v. Thomas, 11 F.3d 1392, 1397 (7th Cir. 1993).
75. Id.
76. Id. The Seventh Circuit also relied on Supreme Court precedent which held that an Edwards
violation does not occur when the suspect started the conversation by asking law enforcement a question
that “evinced a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation . . . .”
Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045-46 (1983).
77. 599 A.2d 66 (Me. 1991).
78. Id. at 67.
79. Id. at 66.
80. Id. at 67.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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suppression motion on the grounds that the detective’s statement was not intended
to elicit an incriminating response.83 The Law Court reversed, holding that the
Superior Court did not properly apply Innis, and reasoned that, “[h]ad the court
applied the appropriate objective standard, it would have concluded that the police
officer should have known, in these circumstances, that the act of displaying the
sketch was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.”84
The Law Court has also ruled on what types of statements and actions of law
enforcement will not give rise to the functional equivalent of a question.85
Although Maine courts had not determined, prior to Bragg, whether a Miranda
warning would be necessary when the suspect was being informed by law
enforcement of evidence against him, the Law Court had prescribed the
“administrative question” or “biographical data exception.”86 The exception
provides that “[a]dministrative questions, not likely to elicit an incriminating
response, include those ‘routine booking questions’ normally attending arrest
which seek only ‘biographical data necessary to complete booking or pretrial
services,’ such as ‘name, address, height, weight, eye color, date of birth, and
current age . . . .’”87
For example, in State v. Brann,88 the defendant’s OUI conviction was vacated
because he made incriminating statements in response to questioning that should
have rendered a Miranda warning.89 In that case, the defendant, Brann, crashed
into a stop sign and fled the scene of the accident.90 Brann was apprehended, and
the police officer asked him who had been driving the car; Brann replied that he
was the driver.91 On appeal, the Law Court agreed with Brann that he should have
been read a Miranda warning before admitting that he was the driver because the
officer’s inquiry “went directly to an element of the offense, indeed to the only
element that reasonably could be disputed since Brann was plainly under the
influence.”92 Although the State argued that the biographical data exception should
apply, the court ruled that the exception was inapplicable because the “question to
Brann had nothing to do with biographical data or other information required for
booking.”93
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See State v. Rizzo, 1997 ME 215, ¶ 13, 704 A.2d 339 (ruling that an officer’s “announcement
of an intent to question” without actually initiating questioning does not rise to the functional equivalent
of a question); State v. Simoneau, 402 A.2d 870, 873 (Me. 1979) (holding that “neutral questions” not
intended to elicit a confession, as well as those questions intended to clarify an ambiguous statement
made by the suspect does not constitute interrogation); State v. Friel, 508 A.2d 123, 128 (Me. 1986)
(ruling that an officer who simply hands a person an arrest and/or search warrant does not subject that
person to interrogation); State v. Sumabat, 566 A.2d 1081, 1083 (Me. 1989) (holding that a defendant’s
voluntary incriminating statements made when the officer was only seeking biographical information
during booking did not rise to interrogation to require a Miranda warning).
86. State v. Brann, 1999 ME 113, ¶ 13, 736 A.2d 251.
87. Id. (quoting Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601 (1990)).
88. 1999 ME 113, 736 A.2d 251.
89. Id. ¶ 1.
90. Id. ¶ 2.
91. Id. ¶ 3.
92. Id. ¶ 14.
93. Id.
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In contrast, in State v. Dominique,94 the Law Court held that statements made
by the defendant to the police officer in an intoxilyzer room were not the product of
interrogation.95 In that case, the defendant, Dominique, was told by the officer
while in custody about the booking process and that he could leave the police
station if his BAC level was below .08%, to which Dominique responded, “It’s not
going to work though.”96 The officer then replied, “No?”97 Dominique then
proceeded to explain that he would fail the test “because [he] had two beers in an
hour” and further explained his rationale for believing why he would fail.98 On
appeal, the Law Court held that the administrative question or biographical data
exception applied because Dominique’s incriminating statements were made in the
course of being told how the intoxilyzer test worked, and while the officer took
down his biographic information in the course of booking—processes which were
“administrative in nature.”99 In addition, the officer’s follow-up question to
Dominique’s statement that the test was “not going to work” was not likely to elicit
an incriminating response, because it was merely a clarifying question.100
These pre-Bragg cases demonstrate that the Law Court had set forth a logical
and proper balance between allowing law enforcement officers to thoroughly
conduct their investigation and protecting the defendant’s rights against selfincrimination. Thus, a defendant in Maine making an argument that he was
entitled to a Miranda warning should be able to anticipate whether his suppression
motion will be granted or denied. Bragg, however, presented the court with a
unique situation.
III. THE BRAGG DECISION
A. Factual Background
On March 11, 2009, Tammy Bragg drove off a road in Rockport on her way
home from a restaurant.101 Sergeant Travis Ford, who had come across Bragg’s
vehicle during his routine patrol route,102 asked Bragg to explain how her car had
gone off the road.103 Bragg responded that she was not exactly sure what had
happened, but thought that she might have hit a patch of ice.104 After smelling
alcohol on Bragg’s breath and noticing that her speech was slurred, Ford asked
Bragg if she had been drinking.105 She responded that she had had two margaritas

94. 2008 ME 180, 960 A.2d 1160.
95. Id. ¶ 1.
96. Id. ¶ 3.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. ¶ 15.
100. Id. ¶ 14. “[T]hreshold or clarifying questions—neutral questions posed by police in response to
an ambiguous statement by a suspect—do not constitute interrogation.” State v. Simoneau, 402 A.2d
870, 873 (Me. 1979).
101. State v. Bragg, 2012 ME 102, ¶ 2, 48 A.3d 769.
102. Id.
103. Id. ¶ 3.
104. Id.
105. Id. ¶ 4.
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during dinner.106 Ford proceeded to conduct several routine tests to evaluate
Bragg’s sobriety, all of which indicated the likelihood that Bragg was
intoxicated.107 Moments after completing the tests, Bragg began to walk towards
her husband who had arrived on the scene, and appeared to be “unsteady.”108 It
was at this time that Ford indicated to Bragg that she was under arrest, and was
taken “to the Camden Police Station to take an intoxilyzer test.”109
The intoxilyzer test showed Bragg’s BAC level to be .13%.110 Without being
prompted by Bragg, Ford accurately shared with her the results of the intoxilyzer
test, and informed her “that the presumptive level of intoxication in Maine is .08% .
. . .”111 Subsequently, Bragg replied that “she had thought when she ordered the
second margarita at dinner it was probably a bad idea.”112 Bragg was then charged
with the Class D crime of operating under the influence.113
B. Procedural History
Prior to trial, Bragg filed a motion to suppress statements she made in Ford’s
cruiser and at the police station on the grounds that she was not read her Miranda
rights.114 The Superior Court denied the motion because Bragg “was not in
custody” when she first began speaking with Ford at the scene, nor was she subject
to interrogation while Ford conducted the field sobriety tests,115 and Ford’s relay of
the intoxilyzer results to Bragg was ‘not the functional equivalent of a question.’116
A jury found Bragg guilty of OUI, and Bragg subsequently appealed the verdict to
the Law Court.117
C. Arguments
On appeal, Bragg argued primarily that Ford’s statement regarding the
intoxilyzer results in conjunction with informing her of the presumptive level of
intoxication in Maine constituted the functional equivalent of a question within the
meaning of Innis.118 Specifically, Bragg contended that Ford’s statement to her at
the police station was not a routine booking or administrative question, but rather a
type of “psychological ploy” because it “clearly posited her guilt” by including that
the legal limit in Maine is .08%:

106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. ¶ 5.
109. Id.
110. Id. ¶ 6.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. “A person commits OUI if that person: Operates a motor vehicle: (1) While under the
influence of intoxicants; or (2) While having an alcohol level of 0.08 grams or more of alcohol per 100
milliliters of blood or 210 liters of breath . . . .” 29-A M.R.S.A. § 2411(1-A)(A) (2011).
114. Bragg, 2012 ME 102, ¶ 7, 48 A.3d 769.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Brief for Appellant at 11, State v. Bragg, 2012 ME 102, 48 A.3d 769 (No. KNO-11-488).
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As the Court explains in Miranda, this psychological ploy is reasonably likely to
elicit an incriminating response.
In fact Ms. Bragg succumbed to the
psychological pressure of this tactic and consequently made statements concerning
what she had to drink, and that she could have called her husband for a ride.
Because Officer Ford used an interrogation technique designed to elicit an
incriminating response, he subjected her to the functional equivalent of
interrogation, and thus her statements should have been suppressed.119

Bragg further argued that her statements to Ford at the police station should
have been suppressed “because the officer presented [her] with information
designed to provoke a response to the suspected offense, rather than a question
designed to elicit biographical data . . . .”120 Bragg contended that Ford’s
presentation of the “test result in the context of Maine’s presumptive level” went
beyond “a mere explanation of the procedure.”121 Finally, Bragg argued that she
was responding directly to a statement made by Ford regarding the test results and
the presumptive level, and Ford should have known that his comments would be
likely to elicit an incriminating response.122 For these reasons, Bragg asked the
court to remand her case to the Superior Court with an order granting her motion to
suppress.123
In contrast, the State argued that Bragg was not subjected to the functional
equivalent of a question within the meaning of Innis124 because
[t]here was no evidence whatsoever during the hearing that Sergeant Ford wanted
to produce or expected to produce an incriminating response when he told [Bragg]
her test result. Especially considering that any person accused of OUI has the
right by statute to obtain “full information concerning a test . . . .” it would be
more surprising if an officer did not tell an arrestee their test results.125

For these reasons, the State asked the court to deny Bragg’s appeal and uphold her
conviction.126
D. Decision of the Law Court
The unanimous court affirmed the denial of Bragg’s suppression motion, both
with respect to her comments made at the scene of the accident127 and those made
119. Id. at 13 (citations omitted).
120. Id. at 13-14.
121. Id. at 14.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 15. For the argument made by Bragg on appeal regarding the issue of whether she was in
custody at the time of her sobriety tests at the scene of the accident and when she was in Ford’s cruiser,
see id. at 6-11.
124. Brief for Appellee at 8, State v. Bragg, 2012 ME 102, 48 A.3d 769 (No. KNO-11-488).
125. Id. (citations omitted).
126. Id. at 9. For the argument made by the State on appeal regarding the issue of whether Bragg
was entitled to a Miranda warning for statements made at the time of her sobriety tests at the scene of
the accident and when she was in Ford’s cruiser, see id. at 5-7.
127. State v. Bragg, 2012 ME 102, ¶¶ 9-13, 48 A.3d 769. The court reasoned that “[t]his brief
detention to investigate is consistent with the characteristics of a [] stop that does not rise to the level of
custody for Fifth Amendment purposes,” id. ¶ 11, and “[e]ven if Bragg had been in custody, however,
her additional contention that the alphabet and counting tests were testimonial would not be persuasive,
as a defendant's performance on field sobriety tests is nontestimonial in nature,” id. ¶ 13.
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at the police station.128 The court acknowledged that the issue—whether an
officer’s statement to a defendant that does nothing more than relay evidence
against him requires the reading of a Miranda warning—was a matter of first
impression in Maine; however, it emphasized that “other courts have recognized
that simply presenting a defendant with evidence against her does not necessarily
constitute an interrogation for Miranda purposes.”129
Addressing Bragg’s argument that Ford’s conveyance of her test results in
combination with informing her of the presumptive level of intoxication in Maine
constituted a statement reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response, the
court held that this statement was not within the scope of Miranda as it was merely
“a matter-of-fact communication of the evidence” in this particular case.130 In fact,
the court agreed with the State that “[g]iven that Bragg was entitled to [the
intoxilyzer results upon request], the officer's simple statement relating that
information, though unrequested, does not constitute a statement reasonably likely
to elicit an incriminating response.”131
IV. ANALYSIS
The Bragg holding—that a police officer’s statement conveying only “matterof-fact communication of evidence” to a defendant will not trigger a Miranda
warning—is a continuation of the Law Court’s tradition of striking the proper
balance between investigative needs and rights of defendants. Nevertheless,
situations may arise where law enforcement officers present a defendant with
truthful, “matter-of-fact” evidence against him, which would nonetheless be
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. The Innis Court cautioned
that, while it must be objectively determined whether a defendant was interrogated,
“[a]ny [subjective] knowledge the police may have had concerning the unusual
susceptibility of a defendant to a particular form of persuasion might be an
important factor” in establishing the need for a Miranda warning.132 Thus, where a
defendant is presented with truthful evidence against him, but where an officer
should know or does know that such “matter-of-fact” presentation is reasonably
likely to elicit an incriminating response, the defendant should be entitled to a
Miranda warning, notwithstanding Bragg.
As the Supreme Court has made clear, the purpose of Miranda is to provide
protection against psychological ploys conducted by police officers that are
128. Id. ¶ 17.
129. Id. ¶ 16. The court cited to an array of cases among the appellate courts regarding this specific
issue of when an officer makes a statement to a defendant that only conveys the evidence against him:
“Caputo v. Nelson, 455 F.3d 45, 50-51 (1st Cir. 2006) (recognizing that other courts have determined
that not all declaratory statements by police regarding the evidence and charges qualify as
interrogation); United States v. Payne, 954 F.2d 199, 202 (4th Cir. 1992) (‘[T]he Innis definition of
interrogation is not so broad as to capture within Miranda's reach all declaratory statements by police
officers concerning the nature of the charges against the suspect and the evidence relating to those
charges.’); Easley v. Frey, 433 F.3d 969, 974 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing Payne with approval and holding
that a trial court did not erroneously admit the defendant's statements in response to ‘a matter-of-fact
communication of the evidence against [the defendant]’).” Id.
130. Bragg, 2012 ME 102, ¶ 16, 48 A.3d 769.
131. Id.
132. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 302 n.8 (1980).
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intended to strip a defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights to be free from selfincrimination. It is not intended, however, to silence all dialogue between officers
and defendants. The Miranda doctrine requires that a defendant be in custody and
subject to interrogation for a Miranda warning to issue, in order to allow police
officers to communicate with a suspect prior to indictment—when the risk of selfincrimination is low. Such allowances not only benefit police officers during the
process of an investigation, but also permit the defendant to be kept aware of the
investigatory process and findings. As the court noted, under Maine statute, Bragg
was entitled to her test results upon request. Although she did not request it, Ford’s
truthful conveyance of this information along with the presumptive level of
intoxication was nothing more than a recitation of the evidence existing against
Bragg, and would not be reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. The
situation would clearly be different had Ford provided Bragg with false evidence
existing against her (e.g., if he had told her that her BAC was .20%). Such an
untruthful conveyance would surely amount to an impermissible psychological
ploy.
The Law Court’s reasoning in Bragg is consistent with other jurisdictions that
have taken on this particular issue. The rulings by the Fourth Circuit in Payne and
the Seventh Circuit in Enoch exemplify courts’ unwillingness to extend Miranda to
situations in which the police officer does nothing more than inform the defendant
of the evidence against him. Both defendants in Payne and Enoch were read their
Miranda rights and were allowed to speak with their attorneys. They then
submitted incriminating responses after being informed of new inculpatory
evidence. The Fourth and Seventh Circuits were correct in rejecting the
defendants’ arguments that they had been subjected to the functional equivalent of
a question upon learning the inculpatory information. Neither Miranda nor Innis
support imposing a type of prolonged silent treatment in which law enforcement
can no longer speak to defendants once they have invoked their Fifth Amendment
rights. If such silence of communication between police officers and defendants
were required, law enforcement officers would be unduly restricted from
continuing their investigations, and defendants would no longer be kept up to date
on the progress of their detained status. In other words, neither side would benefit
from such a restriction.
Appellate courts during the twenty-first century agree with this general
approach.133 These rulings consistently uphold the underlying purpose of
Miranda—to protect Fifth Amendment rights of those who are subject to custodial
interrogation without completely stripping law enforcement officers of their right to
conduct investigations; the courts recognize that such investigations often demand
continuing communications with the suspect. So long as the investigative tactics
are not reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response, they are
constitutionally permissive.
133. See, e.g., United States v. Genao, 281 F.3d 305, 308, 310 (1st Cir. 2002) (ruling that a
defendant’s inculpatory statement made after the police did nothing more than show him drugs and guns
found in his home did not constitute interrogation); Easley v. Frey, 433 F.3d 969, 974 (7th Cir. 2006)
(holding that the trial court did not erroneously admit statements from the defendant in response to “a
matter-of-fact communication of the evidence against [the defendant]”).
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It is no surprise, then, that the defendant in Thomas was not granted her
suppression motion: after all, she initiated the communications. Miranda and Innis
were never intended to extend to communications between the defendant and law
enforcement officers in which no interrogation had taken place. Accordingly,
inculpatory evidence provided to a suspect at his request will not typically require
the issuance of a Miranda warning because it does not constitute the functional
equivalent of a question.
Inculpatory evidence relayed to a defendant without the defendant’s urging,
however, presents a somewhat different situation. As Thomas points out, there
may be some question as to whether an “unsolicited” communication regarding the
evidence against a suspect could constitute the functional equivalent of a question.
The issue of unsolicited communication of evidence to a defendant is central to
Bragg because Bragg never requested the intoxilyzer results.
In United States v. Poole,134 the Ninth Circuit addressed whether such
communication is a form of interrogation.135 The suspect in a bank robbery, Poole,
invoked his right to remain silent after being issued his Miranda rights.136 Instead
of ending communication at that point, however, the special agent “showed Poole
surveillance photographs of the bank robberies and . . . mentioned Poole's
suspected accomplice by name.”137 Upon seeing the photographs, Poole defended
himself, and at the end of questioning, Poole was asked to give his full name, at
which time he responded by providing a false name.138
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the ruling of the district court that any evidence
gathered by Poole’s statements upon seeing the photographs were inadmissible, but
reversed the district court’s ruling that Poole’s “false name” statement was
admissible because it was made during the booking process.139 The Ninth Circuit
explained that the agent’s acts of showing the photographs to Poole and asking for
his biographical information could not be separated, and together constituted
interrogation:
By showing Poole the surveillance photographs and asking questions relating to
them, Special Agent Uda in effect accused Poole of the robberies. Under the
circumstances, Special Agent Uda should have known that Poole would feel
compelled to defend himself and might give a false name in reaction to the
coercive and accusatory interview.140

Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit noted that, even without any additional questioning,
the presentation of the surveillance photos alone under these circumstances would
have constituted interrogation.141
Poole exemplifies the situation where an officer’s truthful, “matter-of-fact”
conveyance to the defendant of inculpatory evidence constitutes interrogation
because it is reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. Poole can be
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

794 F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 466-68.
Id. at 466.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 467.
Id. at 466.
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distinguished from the Law Court’s ruling in Bragg because unlike Ford’s
statement, the special agent’s presentation of the evidence along with additional
questions amounted to the Innis standard. In contrast, interrogation did not exist in
Bragg because Ford’s statement regarding the test results was not accusatory or
intended to solicit additional information from Bragg: Ford simply informed Bragg
of information that she was entitled to know under Maine statute. The Law Court
recognized this distinction and cited to Poole to demonstrate the existence of
situations in which conveyance to the defendant of inculpatory evidence would
require a Miranda warning.142 Although the court did not explicitly address
whether Bragg is a bright-line test for when a Miranda warning will not issue, its
citation to Poole appears to suggest that Bragg will be applied on a case-by-case
basis.
V. CONCLUSION
The Law Court’s decision in Bragg demonstrates a proper application of the
limits to a defendant’s right to receive a Miranda warning, specifically when an
officer does nothing more than truthfully inform the defendant of evidence that
exists against him. These limits are sound, as they protect both the officer and
defendant by ensuring that communication is not completely cut off. Nevertheless,
Maine courts should not view Bragg as a bright-line rule that Miranda does not
apply if a defendant is “simply” informed of evidence against him. There may be
times when law enforcement officers convey untruthful evidence to the defendant,
or when the conveyance of truthful, “matter-of-fact” information could be
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the defendant.
Furthermore, Maine courts must be attentive to situations where an officer’s
questions or presentation of evidence to a defendant are disguised under the
administrative question or biographical data exception or are otherwise
characterized as “matter-of-fact” conveyances of information, and should thus
apply Bragg only on a case-by-case basis.

142. See State v. Bragg, 2012 ME 102, ¶ 16, 48 A.3d 769.

